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"the most valuable birds in the world": international 
conservation SCIENCE AND THE REVIVAL OF PERU'S 
GUANO INDUSTRY, 1909–1965 
GREGORY T. CUSHMAN 
 
EXCREMENT IS NOT considered a topic of polite conversation, yet it is a fundamental and 
unavoidable part of biological existence. Such attitudes have ancient roots in taboos 
governing religious purity. The Mosaic law commanded: "Designate a place outside the camp 
where you can go to relieve yourself. As part of your equipment have something to dig with, 
and when you relieve yourself, dig a hole and cover up your excrement. For the LORD your 
God moves about in your camp to protect you and to deliver your enemies to you. Your camp 
must be holy, so that he will not see among you anything indecent and turn away from you." 
But in our secular age, these attitudes are more a reflection of how divorced urban, industrial 
existence has become from natural cycles and humanity's agrarian roots. Thus, the 
ecologically enlightened in our disposable society now have to read special books about "how 
to shit in the woods" to protect the wilderness from harm. There is even a book to teach 
children that "everyone poops."1 
1  
      This separation is due, in large part, to the great success experts have had at manipulating 
natural processes for the rest of us. A major task experts have been asked to perform over 
time has been to hide, wash away, and otherwise protect us from the scourge of our own 
excreta. As a consequence, the fundamental significance of merde en l'histoire has been 
largely hidden, with one major exception: The extraction of guano, the accumulated 
droppings of marine birds, is a dominant theme in Peruvian history. In fact, the period 1840–
1880 is known as Peru's "Guano Age."2 
2  
      During the first decades of the nineteenth century, European scientific travelers 
appropriated Andean knowledge of vast natural sources of nitrogen along the Peruvian coast 
for use by farmers in the Northern Hemisphere. From 1840–1880, Peru exported an estimated 
12.7 million tons of guano from its islands with a sale value in the range of £150 million ($13 
billion in today's dollars, see Fig. 1).3 This bonanza inspired a global rush to colonize even 
the remotest specks of land in order to exploit any bird colonies—or kanaka laborers—who 
might help produce this valuable fertilizer. Peru's ruling elite tried to use this geographical 
advantage to engineer a modern nation, but their project ended in tragedy, as one of the 
world's great mining booms turned bust. In 1879, after exhausting Peru's major guano 
deposits, the nation's leaders went to war with Chile over a second coastal resource, immense 
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deposits of inorganic sodium nitrate in the Atacama Desert. This devastating war over the 
wealth of nature—one of the largest armed conflicts in the history of the Americas—





Figure 1. Guano Production in Peru, 1840–1975. 
 







      Yet Peru's rulers refused to give up on the belief that Peru's rich marine environment 
would enable them to realize their dreams of national development. Like so many of their 
peers around the world, Peru's rulers looked to scientists for help. They joined a global 
movement at the turn of the twentieth century that empowered conservation technocrats to 
manage the natural world in accord with "the gospel of efficiency." As this study will show, 
this technocratic trend was just as prevalent in some postcolonial states struggling for 
autonomy in the global South as it was in the industrial powers of the North and their colonial 
dependencies. In fact, events in Peru laid the groundwork for U.S. scientists to extend their 
influence to other parts of the postcolonial world, often employing environmental ideas and 
techniques developed elsewhere in the tropics. These scientists not only focused on forests, 
rivers, plantation crops, and big game, they also valued humble creatures—even the 
excrement they produced—as long as they served some productive purpose for humankind.5 
4  
      Scientific conservation achieved one of its greatest triumphs shepherding three wild bird 
species native to the Peruvian coast. Historians of science and technology in the "developing 
world" have long cautioned us to use different criteria for success than those common in the 
industrial world.6 By these and other measures, the revival of Peru's guano industry was 
wildly successful. 
5  
      First and foremost, it was an economic success. Unlike the Guano Age, which depended 
on boom-bust exploitation of centuries-old deposits that were exported to feed crops half a 
world away, this new era relied on a sustained yield of excrement from Peru's existing marine 
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bird population in order to supply domestic agriculture. Beginning in 1909, environmental 
experts implemented a program that led to dramatic increases in the guano bird population 
and the production of excrement for human benefit. Indigenous workers dug up 7.6 million 
metric tons of fresh guano to serve Peruvian agriculture under this new system before its final 
collapse during the El Niño event of 1965. Extraction and sale produced a net profit to the 
Peruvian state and private shareholders worth over $650 million in today's dollars, in addition 
to increases in local agricultural productivity.7 These profits directly funded further scientific 
research in Peru. Compared to the fleeting gains produced by so many development projects, 
the Peruvian guano industry accomplished almost exactly what its managers envisioned over 
a period lasting five decades. 
      Second, this economic success helped foster new mind-sets toward the natural world, 
both in Peru and abroad. It forged a consensus among Peru's ruling elite that the guano birds 
were valuable as a living resource that could be managed much like farm animals. It is 
therefore no coincidence that many Peruvian agronomists—and not a few agribusinessmen—
embraced scientific conservation and attempted to extend its lessons to other realms. A few of 
them became outspoken defenders of the guano birds and other wild creatures. But the guano 
birds turned out to be quite different from domesticated animals: Not only were they 
frustratingly mobile, but their population oscillated wildly, especially during El Niño years. 
In fact, the human beings who dug up guano and applied it to their fields proved much less 
frustrating to manage using scientific techniques. These realities led scientists to become 
intensely aware of the complexity of Peru's marine environment and of the potential 
ecological significance of "all things rude and nasty, ... all creatures short and squat." The 
ability of scientists to rapidly convert these insights into better ways to manage the guano 
birds testifies to the success of their approach to Peru's marine environment.8 
7  
      Finally, the long-term success of this conservation project gave birth to one of nature's 
great spectacles: By the mid-1950s, up to 40 million adult birds patrolled Peru's coastal 
waters. For good reason, mid-century U.S. conservationists hailed this experiment as "the 
greatest of all industries based upon the conservation of wild animals" and sought to extend 
this system to Chile, Mexico, and beyond.9 The variability of Peru's marine ecosystem, 
meanwhile, inspired conservationist William Vogt to reevaluate his attitude toward death and 
decay and to target human population growth as the greatest threat facing modern 
civilization, a view that became orthodoxy for the modern environmental movement.10 
Historians must look to such success stories in order to understand how experts acquired 
enormous influence worldwide over environmental governance in the course of the twentieth 
century, as well as to evaluate the limitations to expertise, especially when it is associated 
with authoritarian rule.11 
8  
    
SOLVING "A NATIONAL PROBLEM"   
IN THE AFTERMATH of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), a few Peruvians began 
looking for ways to make guano a part of postwar economic reconstruction. In 1890, the 
Peruvian government ratified the so-called Grace Contract. This agreement discharged Peru's 
huge foreign debt and restored its ability to negotiate international loans. In return, the 
Peruvian Corporation of London received control of Peru's railways for sixty-six years. The 
Peruvian Corporation promised to extend and modernize these lines in return for 2 million 
tons of guano, while the Peruvian government reserved the right to extract guano from the 
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Map 1. The Guano-Bearing Regions of the Peruvian 
Coast. 
 






      After more than a decade of almost constant civil war, Peru regained a measure of 
political stability when the charismatic strongman Nicolás de Piérola grabbed the reins of 
power in 1895. He agreed to share influence over Peru's central government with the old 
oligarchy that retained power along the coast from the prosperous days of the guano boom. 
This loose confederation of elites gained further support by recognizing the regional power of 
the landed aristocracy of the Andean highlands, or Sierra. These interest groups joined 
together in part because they shared a desire to put Peru back on the path to prosperity. Power 
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sharing allowed Peru to enjoy a relatively peaceful period from 1895 to 1919, which 
historians term the "Aristocratic Republic."13 
      Political peace allowed economic expansion to return to Peru. Mine owners and wool 
producers enjoyed greater access to markets linked to the expanded railroad system in the 
Sierra. Plantation sugar production along the coast grew rapidly thanks to favorable 
international prices, and even the remote Amazon region prospered briefly during the rubber 
export boom. This expansion also derived from the development of local industry; the 
beginnings of copper, cotton, and petroleum exports; and the influx of U.S. investment. These 
development patterns led to the wholesale transformation of local ecosystems, as they were 
integrated with the world economy. Agricultural development also meant that the Chinchas 
became inadequate to supply the growing fertilizer demand from coastal fields of export 
crops.14 
11  
      The return of prosperity nurtured a progressive, nationalist ethos among Peru's coastal 
elite. The rulers of country after country around the world during this era looked to "scientific 
politics" as the answer to the ubiquitous problem of "order and progress." Self-proclaimed 
positivists promoted the scientific study of natural resources and hoped to use these studies to 
craft plans for their rational development. To this end, the Peruvian state organized a Ministry 
of Development and several other scientific institutions.15 
12  
      Peru's incredibly rich coastal waters were an obvious target for scientific development. 
Large-scale geophysical forces cause prevailing southeast trade winds to blow along the 
Peruvian coast. These forces push the surface waters of the Pacific Ocean toward the 
northwest to be replaced by cool, subsurface water. As in all upwelling ecosystems, 
enormous populations of phytoplankton flourish on dissolved nutrients surfacing from below. 
In the words of Robert Cushman Murphy these microscopic organisms provisioned "vast, 
seething schools of surface fish, breaching whales, incredible flocks of birds ... bands of 
frolicking lobos ... [and] enormous shoals of porpoises," making coastal Peru one of the most 
productive marine environments in the world. On the adjacent land, in contrast, these 
conditions create one of the most arid, least productive natural environments in the world. 
This dryness inhibits both the microbiological breakdown of uric acid (C5H4N3O3) and the 
leaching of water-soluble ammonia (NH3) and ammonium salts (NH4+) from guano deposits 
and makes them uniquely rich in nitrogen. Unfortunately for most of the creatures that 
depend on these climatic conditions, the Peruvian littoral is periodically disturbed when the 
trade winds fail, thus allowing the influx of warm, nutrient-poor waters from the north. A 
local term for this phenomenon is now used by scientists to denote one of the world's most 
important climate mechanisms: the El Niño-Southern Oscillation.16 
13  
      In 1906, following a long-established pattern of consulting foreign experts for 
developmental advice, the Peruvian Ministry of Development hired fishery biologist Robert 
Coker to study its marine resources and formulate "scientific principles" to serve as "a guide 
to the conservation and reproduction of species" in Peruvian territorial waters, Reliance on 
external advisers has been one of the hallmarks of technocratic management of natural 
resources, not just in Latin America but throughout the colonial and postcolonial world. 
Indeed, outside experts played a controversial role in evaluating the extent of Peru's guano 
deposits during the nineteenth century.17 The son of a prominent South Carolina cotton 
planter, Coker had recently completed a PhD in zoology at Johns Hopkins and a series of 
government reports establishing new policies for oyster conservation along the Carolina 
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coast. Peru wanted Coker primarily to help revive its depleted marine shellfish industry, but 
he accomplished much more. In his report on the guano birds, Coker identified three species 
that produced usable quantities of excrement: the guanay (Phalocrocorax bougainvillei, a 
small cormorant or shag), the piquero (Sula variegata, a booby), and the Peruvian pelican 
(Pelecanus thagus, a close relative of the North American brown pelican), all members of the 
order Pelicaniformes (See Fig. 2).18 Coker countered the widespread notion that Peru's guano 
deposits were close to disappearing forever. He thought the remaining birds could easily 
produce enough excrement to fulfill the needs of both Peruvian agriculture and the Grace 
Contract if Peruvians stopped acting "like beasts of prey" toward the guano birds and began 




Figure 2. Symbols of Peru's Guano Age, Old and New. 
 
Courtesy PROABONOS, Peru. 
A shipwrecked guano vessel alongside a vibrant colony of 
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      As with Carolina oysters, Coker thought rational management of the guano birds required 
state intervention. He recommended a five-part policy designed to produce a sustained yield 
of guano each year: 1) Peru should immediately turn all coastal islands into a bird sanctuary 
under state supervision and permanently prohibit any private use of island resources, such as 
egg collecting and hunting. 2) Only one state contractor per island should receive the 
concession for guano extraction, in the hope of relieving the disruption of breeding caused by 
intense competition for deposits. 3) Peru should establish a permanent closed season during 
the November to March breeding period to allow the birds to reproduce in peace. 4) But since 
the entire year was important to the cycle of breeding, Peru should implement a rotation 
policy. Each island should be closed for at least one year between each season of guano 
production—the longer the closed period, the more the birds could reproduce. Peru already 
had implemented a rotation policy on the three Chincha islands to protect the guano birds, but 
Coker recommended applying this policy systematically to all the guano-producing areas in 
Peru. 5) Ideally, Peru should create a national monopoly responsible for the entire process of 
guano production and distribution. Coker strongly believed that a single, state-run company 
with a long-term stake in the bird's welfare would best provide for Peru's common interest. 
Since the Peruvian state already owned the guano islands, it possessed most of the legal 
power it needed to make these changes. In classic technocratic fashion, Coker quantified the 
wealth he thought Peru would accrue from his scientific plan: He "conservatively appraised" 
the guano produced by each pair of birds at $15 per year.20 
15  
      As in the United States, conservationists found many converts to the gospel of efficiency 
among Peru's capitalist class. Though a foreign scientist prepared the ground for the revival 
of the Peruvian guano industry, prominent Peruvians actually planted the seed. In March 
1909, Cuban-born financier José Payán de Reyna (president of the Lima stock exchange) and 
President Augusto Leguía (former manager of the British Sugar Company and outspoken 
admirer of the United States) masterminded the formation of the Compañía Administradora 
del Guano (CAG). This parastatal company received the sole right to extract, transport, 
unload, and sell guano to Peruvian farmers. CAG was strictly required to protect the guano 
birds in "whatever relates to the reproduction of fertilizer." An executive decree gave CAG 
direct control over all bird colonies south of Callao except for a region stretching from the 
Ballestas Islands to Punta Doña María.21 
16  
      CAG faced a crisis of public confidence almost as soon as it began producing guano. 
Guano sales to Peruvian farmers fell precipitously during CAG's first three years of operation 
as CAG rotated harvests on the Chincha Islands, the most productive area under its 
jurisdiction. To make matters worse, "sinister ocean currents" arrived from the north in 1911 
and caused the guano birds to flee their breeding colonies en masse; this El Niño event ruined 
the season's production of fresh guano and caused the deaths of tens of thousands of nestlings 
and eggs. Meanwhile, the Peruvian Corporation of London continued to export two-thirds of 
Peru's total output during these years. Local farmers hoarded whatever they could of the 
limited supply. This situation eventually spurred the Peruvian government to close the 
Ballestas Islands, the Peruvian Corporations's most productive territory, in March 1914 in 
order to allow the bird population and guano levels to regenerate. The islands were to reopen 
in 1916, but only to provide fertilizer for Peruvian agriculture.22 
17  
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
      The Peruvian government justified this aggressive action by invoking the twenty-first 
clause of the Grace Contract, which allowed "the government of Peru to consume the guano 
that is necessary for its agriculture" and which gave the Peruvian Corporation the sole right to 
export "existing guano." British stockholders immediately protested and warned that this 
unilateral action would threaten Peru's ability to negotiate foreign loans, but the Peruvian 
executive and Congress stood firmly by the decree. A consortium of farming and industrial 
interests chimed in with a statement that reveals the mentality behind CAG's creation. "The 
rational fertilizing of the earth," they asserted, acted as the key to agricultural growth, since it 
"put into circulation ... materials that exist in a latent state in nature." This practice enabled 
the "necessary progressive evolution" of Peruvian agriculture "from an extensive to an 
intensive system." With its unique capacity to produce guano, Peru could make up for its 
"inferior economic conditions" and quickly catch up with rich agricultural nations. Input-
intensive agriculture also would solve dire social problems: it would accomplish "progressive 
enculturation" of Peru's rural poor and lower food prices for the coastal "proletarian masses." 
In other words, Peru had an enormous stake in this controversy because guano had the 
potential to carry the nation forward into the modern world.23 
18  
      A foreign expert added fuel to this controversy. In fact, the Peruvian Corporation's 
European managers had long known that they depended on Peru's living guano birds for their 
share of the guano harvest. The Peruvian Corporation hand-picked its own expert to study 
declining production and discover means to encourage its "conservation and increase"—
Scottish naturalist Henry O. Forbes, a distinguished scientific explorer of Oceania and bird 
enthusiast who recently had retired as director of the Museums of Liverpool. Although he did 
not recognize the connection, Forbes may have been the first naturalist to study the ecological 
impact of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation on both sides of the Pacific. He witnessed the 
ravages of the great drought of 1877–1878 on the forests and plantations of Indonesia, and he 
arrived in Peru on Christmas Day, 1911, just in time to witness the advent of El Niñño. After 
receiving President Leguía's blessing, Forbes spent more than a year studying Peru's guano 
birds in the field.24 
19  
      In a February 1913 report, Forbes outlined major threats to the guano industry. He 
acknowledged the danger posed by El Niño and the guano birds' natural enemies, but he 
focused far more on the ways human behavior jeopardized the guano birds' well-being. First, 
he noted that ill-timed extraction often interfered with mating and nesting. He particularly 
condemned exploitation on the Ballestas Islands, where for the past ten years the Peruvian 
Corporation consistently had begun harvest in April, before the chicks could fly. Forbes 
admonished, "This is without a doubt one of the principal causes of the decline of the birds." 
Second, he pointed out the threat posed by coastal fishermen and guano workers who illegally 
stole eggs and chicks, although he discounted the damage caused by illegal dynamite use and 
other fishing techniques that potentially affected the birds' food supply. Third, he criticized 
the hiring of independent contractors to harvest guano on the islands because they sought to 
maximize short-term profits with little regard for the birds' welfare.25 
20  
      Forbes concluded with a series of recommendations. Anyone who expected this product 
of British imperial science to automatically decide in favor of his employers was sorely 
mistaken. Forbes took a radical stand on the meaning of clause twenty-one of the Grace 
Contract: The Peruvian Corporation only had the right to mine deposits that existed in 1890; 
in his view, the Peruvian Corporation had since stolen thousands of tons of fresh guano that 
rightfully belonged to the Peruvian nation. Therefore, he declared that all guano islands 
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except for Lobos de Afuera should be put under CAG's conservation-minded administration; 
the Peruvian Corporation could mine the old, rain-leached, nitrogen-poor guano deposits on 
this island to fulfill its remaining quota. Following Coker's lead, Forbes suggested additional 
policies to improve the birds' welfare: 1) private contractors should be banned from 
harvesting guano; 2) yearly extraction should take place only during the winter between 
breeding seasons; 3) the period between harvests on each island should be increased to three 
or four years; 4) no unauthorized visitor should come within one mile of the islands at any 
time; 5) the guano birds' natural predators should be systematically shot or poisoned; 6) an 
armed guardian force with gasoline-powered boats should patrol the coastal waters to keep 
the islands in "a state of perfect rest." Furthermore, Forbes advised Peru to set up coastal 
research stations to record oceanographic data and to hire scientists to regularly inspect the 
islands.26 
      Despite pressure from nationalists in the Peruvian Congress to escalate the confrontation, 
CAG made a deal. CAG promised to purchase fertilizer directly from the Peruvian 
Corporation in order to provide fertilizer to all Peruvian farmers who requested it. To prevent 
hoarding, CAG agronomists acquired the power to closely supervise Peruvian agricultural 
practices. These actions enabled CAG in 1915–1916 to meet national fertilizer demand for 
the first time without rationing.27 
22  
      Far-away events ultimately resolved this controversy. World War I created an enormous 
market for sodium nitrate from the Atacama Desert to keep Europe's guns blazing. High 
freight costs from South America and the post-war depression prevented the Peruvian 
Corporation from exporting guano from mid-1916 until mid-1920. The corporation's absence 
freed CAG to take over management of the entire coast. Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch, 
meanwhile, developed an industrial technique to synthesize nitrogen compounds. Their 
discovery enabled Germany to keep fighting. The Allies learned the secrets of this catalytic 
process as one of the spoils of war. Powered by cheap fossil fuels, chemical giants DuPont 
and BASF soon built enormous fortunes producing nitrogen fertilizer (and eventually nylon) 
using the Haber-Bosch process. By the time of the Great Crash, this technological revolution 
had eliminated the northern market for both guano and nitrates, even as it accelerated the 
worldwide shift toward input-intensive agricultural practices that began during the Guano 
Age. On 12 November 1929, with the world hurtling toward the worst economic depression 
in modern history, the Peruvian Corporation gave up its remaining interest in the Peruvian 
guano industry, even though it was still owed 624,000 long tons under the terms of the Grace 
Contract.28 The leaders of Peru's Aristocratic Republic thus used foreign expertise to their 
advantage in order to establish national autonomy in fertilizer production (albeit to export 
crops for consumption in Europe and North America). This qualified as a major success for 
this oft-maligned "neocolonial" era of Peru's history—a success comparable to the great 
hydraulic and forestry projects built by the científicos and positivists in charge of Porfirian 
Mexico and Brazil's Old Republic.29 
23  
    
MANAGING AN AGROECOLOGICAL SYSTEM   
DURING THE TWENTY-FIVE years following Forbes's 1913 report, CAG technocrats 
gradually consolidated their control over a complex agroecological system linking the 
enormous productivity of Peru's marine environment to the export of staple crops from the 
adjacent coast.30 They used the latest scientific understanding, not only to manipulate the 
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wide variety of organisms affecting the welfare of birds, but also to manage the behavior of 
human beings who extracted and used guano. Conservationism, hygienism, and Taylorism 
worked in tandem to maximize the production of excrement for Peru during an era when 
scientific management took the world by storm—on both sides of the North-South, East-
West, urban-rural, and human-animal divides. Ecology was a science of industrialization.31 
      The most significant action taken by CAG during its early years involved protecting the 
birds from the guano industry itself. Scientific traveler Robert Cushman Murphy descibed 
"thick beds of bones in hollows and gulches" on the guano islands, which evinced the 
industry's destructive potential. According to locals, thousands of young birds "were driven to 
slaughter by wanton guano contractors in the old time purely [to get] them out of the way of 
the diggers." Following Forbes's recommendation, CAG stopped contracting out the guano 
harvest in 1914. This gave CAG much more control over the behavior of its workers, and 
they were strictly ordered to leave the birds alone. CAG consistently set harvest times to 
come after the end of peak nesting season on each island. With these policies in place, the 
guanay and piquero became acclimated to the presence of workers, while the breeding 
pelicans on Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra flourished during the Peruvian 
Corporation's wartime absence. Later scientific studies showed that CAG's extraction 
practices caused, at worst, an ephemeral, local decrease in the guano bird population.32 
25  
      In contrast, the rotation policy promoted by Coker and Forbes was not nearly as important 
to reproductive success as these scientists predicted. CAG rotated harvests on most islands 
and points, but it did this quite haphazardly. It made almost no attempt to alternate harvests 
on two of its most productive guano islands, Isla Guañape (dominated by piqueros) and Isla 
Macabí (dominated by guanays). That laxness had no obvious ill effects. CAG's managers 
instead chose to follow the expert recommendations of agricultural chemists whose studies 
showed that guano on these relatively damp, northern islands lost significant potency after a 
year or two. Nevertheless, CAG consistently credited its "scientific" rotation policy for 
production increases, even when the practice was criticized.33 
26  
      Both Coker and Forbes agreed that island trespassers posed another significant threat to 
the guano birds. The presence of a malevolent human collecting guano, eggs, or chicks could 
spook an entire colony. Consequently, CAG established permanent guard stations (usually 
manned by a single guard) on nine islands and three coastal areas in 1915–1916 to protect the 
largest colonies. It gradually extended this network to encompass the entire coast, as 
company finances permitted. Their presence practically eliminated the trespassing problem. 
But CAG's guardian system had a decidedly negative impact on other coastal bird species. 
Island guards routinely hunted three birds to provide fresh meat for their sparsely provisioned 
tables: the potoyunco or Peruvian diving petrel (Pelecanoides garnotii), the chuita or red-
footed shag (Phalacrocorax gaimardi), and the pingüino or Humboldt penguin (Spheniscus 
humboldti). Repeated guano extraction also disturbed the breeding of the potoyunco and 
Humboldt penguin by removing the material they need to dig nesting burrows. These birds, 
common during the mid-nineteenth century, were virtually eliminated from the guano islands. 
Today, despite recent legal protections, the chuita is classified as "nearthreatened" and the 
Humboldt penguin as "vulnerable." The potoyunco only breeds in four locations and is in 
imminent danger of extinction. These marine birds were unintended victims of the guano 
industry's success.34 
27  
      CAG intentionally tried to rid the guano birds' natural enemies from Peru's coastal 28  
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islands. The simeón or band-tailed gull (Larus belcheri), the cleo or kelp gull (L. 
dominicanus), the pájaro ladrón or southern skua (Catharacta skua), the gallinazo or turkey 
vulture (Cathartes aura), and the buitre or Andean condor (Vultur gryphus) all preyed on the 
eggs and chicks of the guano birds. The gavilán or peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus), in 
contrast, caught adult guano birds on the wing. In 1915, in line with Forbes's 
recommendation, CAG began systematic extermination of these predatory birds as a part of 
its comprehensive conservation policy. In 1918, CAG armed its entire force of island 
guardians and lighthouse keepers to shoot predatory birds on sight. Robert Cushman Murphy 
reported that marksmen killed more than five thousand gulls in February and March 1917 on 
the southern islands, although the birds were "extremely abundant" again when he visited a 
couple of years later. Murphy at first thought it "seemed criminal that sharpshooters ... should 
be employed for the express purpose of killing such magnificent creatures as condors. But 
after witnessing the damage that these birds had done at Asia" Island, where eighteen condors 
systematically eliminated the island's entire breeding colony in a matter of days, his 
"sympathies inclined more toward the victims and the practical attitude of the guano 
administration." Since CAG raised "defenseless" guano birds in "a system of more or less 
artificial culture," Murphy's moral calculus allowed these "veritable harpys" to be executed 




Figure 3. Casualties of the War Against Varmints. 
 
From Robert Cushman Murphy, Bird Islands of Peru 
(1925). 
Andean condors (Vultur gryphus) killed by CAG 
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      From 1937 to 1939, CAG purchased 47,500 shotgun cartridges to kill predatory birds, an 
indication of the scale of this organized slaughter. But this was not wanton killing: Abundant 
evidence shows that these campaigns against "varmints" (especially condors) were vital to the 
establishment of new colonies and the rapid expansion of the guano bird population. Luckily, 
these campaigns were never extensive enough to extirpate predatory birds from the coast.36 
29  
      The same cannot be said for a more vulnerable member of the marine community. Lobos 
del mar or sea lions (Otaria flavescens) occupied an ambiguous place in CAG's official 
predator policy. Many local fishermen believed that "a working understanding" operated 
between the lobo and the guanay: Sea lions attacked from below and herded the fish to the 
surface where birds (and fishermen) could pick them off at will. Based on this belief, Peru 
banned sea lion hunting in 1896. Then Robert Coker published a study on the subject. As a 
good conservation scientist indoctrinated to the gospel of efficiency, Coker valued the lobos 
in terms of their impact on the guano birds and other marine industries. He concluded that 
lobos were neither beneficial nor harmful toward the guano birds; therefore, from the guano 
industry's point of view, they could be hunted for their skins, oil, meat, and whiskers. 
President Leguía followed Coker's suggestion and reopened lobos hunting in 1910. CAG 
obtained a five-year monopoly concession to hunt lobos in 1919 and again in 1936, based on 
the argument that independent sea lion hunters posed a threat to the guano birds. CAG killed 
as many as 36,500 lobos (mostly pups) in a single season, both to supply the local fur trade 
and increase the company's profitability, and to guard against the off chance that they might 
someday kill a guano bird. Coker provided no compelling reason to preserve large sea lion 
populations, which a new generation of market fishermen came to view as pests. So the 
Peruvian state made little attempt to rein in the killing, despite the caution of later scientists, 
until the lobos population bottomed out at eight thousand in 1961. A single conservationist's 
utilitarian stance thus nearly led to a regional extinction.37 
30  
      CAG looked to a different set of experts to orchestrate its campaign against the guano 
birds' microscopic parasites. Bio-medicine was the most advanced sector of Peru's scientific 
establishment during the early twentieth century, as it was in many parts of Latin America. 
This was due in part to the far-reaching triumph of tropical medicine, but also to growing 
interest in tropical plant pathology, livestock diseases, and a vigorous local tradition of 
environmental medicine known as "Andean biology."38 After Forbes's report, CAG workers 
began systematically dumping tons of island stones into the ocean to "clean" the islands for 
the birds. With this policy, CAG hoped to rid the islands of blood-sucking ticks (Ornithidorus 
tulaje and O. amblus) which lived under surface rocks, infested the birds and guano workers, 
and potentially carried blood parasites. CAG became obsessed with pathogens in the wake of 
the 1917 El Niño. In one of the first major scientific papers on the ecological impact of El 
Niño, Peruvian agronomic engineer José Antonio de Lavalle y García concluded that the 
common fungus Aspergillus fumigatus had caused massive bird mortality on the guano 
islands during the changed, "tropical" climate of this event. He believed disease threatened 
the well-being of the entire guano industry, so he recommended burning all bird corpses, 
culling all sick birds, and spraying the islands with sanitizing disinfectant or hot water after 
each harvest. In 1924, famed Peruvian bacteriologist Julio César Gastiaburú Rocco made a 
major discovery. He isolated the first wild instance of deadly avian cholera (Pasteurella 
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multocida), a bacteria typically spread by fecal contact. CAG eventually banned domestic 
fowl from the islands to prevent the introduction of new avian diseases.39 
      The principles of conservation, efficiency, and hygiene also influenced CAG's managerial 
stance toward guano workers and their ecology. Guano production still depended upon back-
breaking labor with simple hand tools: pickax, shovel, screen, jute sack, and brooms to pick 
up the last speck of valuable dust. The guano industry no longer imported coolie workers 
from East Asia, as it had in the nineteenth century. Instead, CAG recruited seasonal wage 
laborers from the Sierra.40 
32  
      Working conditions on the guano islands were difficult if not downright dangerous, 
although they were a marked improvement over the dark days of the Guano Age. Most guano 
workers contracted conjunctivitis, chronic coughs, and other respiratory problems from 
exposure to pulverized guano. Bronchitis, malaria (the scourge of highland migrants to the 
coast), and influenza were the most common causes of worker hospitalization. Their disease 
ecology also overlapped with the guano birds: Ticks, especially in their larval stage, easily 
adapted to feasting on human hosts. As on coastal plantations, CAG provided a spartan diet 
of easily transportable foods: rice, beans, dried meat, hard bread, and tea with sugar. During 
CAG's early years, workers occasionally suffered from scurvy from lack of fresh food. Guano 
workers had to provide their own bedding and usually slept in crude tents made from wood 
frames, woven cane, and old sacks that typically harbored clouds of flies bred by poor 
sanitation standards. Hygienists and labor activists routinely complained about this work 
environment. In response, beginning in 1916, CAG paid a series of physicians to study health 
conditions on the islands, recommend improvements, and provide free medical care to its 
workers. Their intervention led to the gradual construction of new hospitals and 
"scientifically prepared, hygienic habitations" on the islands. In later years, in line with 
populist tendencies in Peruvian politics, CAG offered life insurance and off-season housing 
to its workers and sports facilities on the islands. The fact that CAG was publicly owned 
made it far more receptive to pressure to improve working conditions than privately owned 
businesses in the region.41 
33  
      But all of this came at a cost for workers. CAG scrutinized the workers with disciplinary 
zeal. Even worker defecation and sexual practices came under surveillance. Physicians not 
only sought to avoid polluting the guano islands with human excrement, they also sought to 
prevent fights, sodomy, and other so-called pathological behaviors on these remote island 
outposts. During the early 1940s, when CAG began paying its workers by the task in an 
attempt to increase worker efficiency in response to a fiscal crisis caused by El Niño, it hired 
a new class of overseers (tarjadores) to carefully record every kilo of guano produced and 
every gram of food eaten. CAG relied on scientific management to discipline its workers into 
increasing guano production, rather than resorting to violence, as it had against the guano 
birds' natural enemies. Remarkably, the guano islands were mostly free of labor unrest over 
the years.42 
34  
      From this ecological base on the guano islands, CAG gradually built an integrated 
industry with monopoly control over almost all levels of fertilizer production, transport, and 
sale in Peru. Burros, small railway cars, and trolleys were the only labor-saving devices in 
use in 1909, but CAG gradually built an extensive island infrastructure with docks, roads for 
motorized tractors, barracks, administration buildings, guard houses, and even lighthouses to 
aid coastal navigation. CAG started without any boats to carry guano to port. It purchased its 
35  
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
first steamer in 1912 and by 1926 controlled a large, diverse fleet of steamers, pontoon boats, 
and sailing ships. CAG gradually developed a network of warehouses and shops to distribute 
guano, including several offices in the Sierra that provided agricultural extension services. 
But CAG's most important innovation involved price-setting. A CAG official removed a 
scoop of guano from every sack that arrived at a mainland port, mixed it in a bag with 
samples from all other sacks in the same shipment, and sent the combined sample to Lima for 
chemical assay. Purchasers promised to pay a standard price set by the Peruvian central 
government based on the average nitrogen content of the lot. Faith in chemical science 
guaranteed the hidden content of this product and the value of the exchange. This "objective" 
system replaced the face-to-face negotiation once used to set agricultural prices with an 
impersonal standard set by technocrats far away.43 
      CAG's duties went beyond fertilizer extraction and delivery. Its mission to promote 
scientific modernization focused on CAG's customers—Peruvian farmers. An agronomist 
trained at Peru's new National Agricultural School, José Antonio de Lavalle y García, took 
the lead in these endeavors. Like so many sons of the ruling families of Peru's Aristocratic 
Republic, Lavalle chose a technical career. In 1914, after making a name for himself touring 
the Peruvian coast studying fertilizer use and defending CAG from its critics, he took charge 
of CAG's Technical Section. Besides fertilizer assays, labs under his supervision performed 
free soil, water, and pesticide analyses for farmers interested in using the latest scientific 
techniques to manage their crops. In 1926, CAG organized its own agricultural research 
station under his command. Farmers also received propaganda and scientific studies from 
CAG that promoted scientific agriculture, including a monthly illustrated Boletín (1925–
1967). These publications provided a vital public outlet for scientific research in Peru for 
more than four decades. They constantly reminded farmers that their soil's fertility was 
derived from nearby marine birds, in stark contrast to the abstraction of commodities from 
their original ecological context so often characteristic of modern agriculture.44 
36  
      Core members of Peru's dominant class, agro-exporters, reaped enormous benefits from 
this agroecological system, which redirected the enormous productivity of Peru's marine 
environment to the adjacent coast. Peruvian law kept guano prices low while paying 
substantial dividends to the Peruvian state and CAG's private investors (most of whom were 
agribusinessmen). Twenty-five large purchasers consumed half of CAG's total production 
from 1909–1935, even though they represented a miniscule fraction of the farming entities 
that purchased guano. Cultivators of less than one hectare received only one-tenth of CAG's 
total production during this period; the other 90 percent went almost exclusively to vast 
monocultures of two export crops, sugar cane and cotton (see Fig. 4).45 These guano 
distribution practices clearly reflected Peruvian social realities: the concentration of irrigated 
coastal landholdings in the hands of a few, the lasting political power of coastal 
agroexporters, and their continuing dependence on consumers in the Northern Hemisphere. 
Meanwhile, the majority of coastal Peruvians, even those who worked the land, came to rely 
on expensive imported foodstuffs for survival. A series of crises eventually forced CAG to 
address the notorious "land problem" along the Peruvian coast.46 That CAG was able to adapt 
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Figure 4. An Industrial Island in a Monocultural Sea. 
 
From George R. Johnson, Peru from the Air (1930). 
W. R. Grace & Co.'s Paramonga sugar estate near Supe. This 
plantation purchased 48,413 tons of guano from 1909–1935, 





    
DEALING WITH "ECOLOGICAL DEPRESSION"   
THE AGROECOSYSTEM MANAGED by CAG was not stable. Far from it. CAG's 
managers confronted significant El Niño events in 1911–1912 and 1917. Led by Lavalle, 
CAG used scientific studies of these events to repudiate the criticism that their 
mismanagement was the real cause for the marked decline in guano production during the 
company's first decade. This strategy was so successful that CAG was able to extend its 
authority to new parts of Peru's economy and coastal environment in the wake of these 
ecological disturbances. Of course, the guano birds did the real work of recovery. The 
guanay, in particular, was adapted to reproduce quickly once El Niño conditions went away 
and upwelling resumed. CAG and its conservation ideals proved to be nearly as resilient. 
38  
      In 1925, a devastating El Niño event struck Peru and caused a marked decline in guano 
production.47 Francisco Ballén, CAG's general manager since 1909, tried to pass the blame 
onto Peruvian fishermen. He jealousy guarded CAG's monopoly control over the guano 
islands, and he rightly understood that a large fishing industry had the potential to hurt the 
guano birds by consuming their food. He had been trying for years to evict decades-old 
colonies of fisher folk from Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra and to prevent the Callao 
and Vicinity Fishermen's Union from obtaining concessions to fish within the two-mile 
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exclusion zone surrounding all guano islands. In the wake of the 1925 disaster, he 
successfully convinced an old friend of CAG, President Leguía, to establish a Fishery Police 
under CAG's control in line with Forbes's 1913 report. This request fit Leguía's new political 
style: After barely winning a second term in 1919, he had used authoritarian means to rule 
what remained of the Aristocratic Republic. With the help of three gasoline-powered patrol 
boats custom-built in Europe, CAG's fishery police detained and helped prosecute several 
law-breaking fishermen.48 As with so many conservation programs worldwide, the creation of 
guano island reserves criminalized many traditional practices and generated intense conflicts 
with competing users of Peru's marine environment. With Leguía's consent, CAG went to war 
to protect its nature sanctuaries from interloping fishermen.49 
      Beginning in 1930, the guano industry faced a different sort of crisis. The Great Crash 
caused Leguía's debt-fueled, eleven-year dictatorship to collapse— and forced Ballén to step 
down as CAG's general manager. As a hallmark of these changing times, Colonel Luis 
Sánchez Cerro transferred administration of CAG's Fishery Police to the maritime authority 
in 1931, and the Peruvian Armada expropriated its patrol boats. The institutional military 
recovered its monopoly over advanced weaponry as part of an unprecedented assertion of 
political power. CAG abruptly reached the limits of its political influence within the Peruvian 
government. But the gospel of efficiency on which CAG was founded proved adaptable to 
these new circumstances. In fact, Lavalle ended up with a higher administrative post.50 
40  
      Meanwhile, world prices for sugar and cotton collapsed. Peruvian farmers immediately 
stopped purchasing fertilizer and other expensive inputs. But CAG quickly developed 
arrangements to provide farmers with easy, long-term credit for fertilizer purchases. This 
lending pattern led to the establishment of the Banco Agrícola, an institution that significantly 
improved the financial situation of small-and mid-sized farms during the 1930s. Credit made 
it possible for many new farms to adopt input-intensive practices, including a few in the 
Sierra; this began to reverse the socially regressive patterns of guano distribution during 
CAG's early years.51 
41  
      This successful response to the Great Depression created unforeseen problems. Cotton 
prices skyrocketed in the mid-1930s, and Peruvian farmers along the central and southern 
coast scrambled to convert their land holdings to cotton. CAG had no way to raise guano 
production to meet this new demand. It responded by trying to force farmers to use guano 
more efficiently: CAG rationed guano distribution to major purchasers, distributed 
propaganda discouraging waste, and created a commission of agronomic engineers to tour 
coastal farms and determine their fertilizer requirements. As a last resort, CAG raised the 
price for growers of export crops, while giving preference to smallholders and food crops. 
These policies marked a broad reorientation in the guano industry, reflecting the populist turn 
in Peruvian politics during the 1930s.52 
42  
      But CAG continued to rely on expert guidance. Building on past patterns of success, 
CAG used its inflated profits to hire an ornithologist from the United States to study ways to 
increase guano production. As it turned out, CAG was able to acquire the services of William 
Vogt, a major figure in North American birding circles and a budding leader of the U.S. 
conservation movement. Unlike Coker and Lavalle, both university-trained professionals, 
Vogt acquired his scientific expertise as an avocational birder rubbing elbows in the museum 
and field with Ernst Mayr, Roger Tory Peterson, Robert Cushman Murphy, Margaret Morse 
Nice, and other New York-area scientists. Besides collaborating on published studies of local 
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marine birds, Vogt played an active role organizing larger-scale endeavors, such as the 
Audubon Society's Breeding Bird Census (est. 1937), that sought to understand, protect—and 
perhaps direct—the flow of migratory birds in North America.53 
      Vogt carried two bibles with him to Peru, his close friend Aldo Leopold's Game 
Management and Charles Elton's Animal Ecology, and Vogt extended their influence to a vast 
new frontier.54 Following their lead, Vogt implemented a "holistic" study of the guano birds 
and their environment during his three-year tenure in Peru. He set up the first large-scale 
banding project on the Peruvian coast, and he used aerial photos to make the first accurate 
bird census. Vogt's inspiration not only came from the far North, it also built on existing 
Peruvian research traditions. Following the precedent set by Lavalle, Vogt studied the 
microclimate of bird nesting behavior and confirmed that the birds preferred to nest in areas 
exposed to the prevailing winds.55 
44  
      But Vogt had a difficult time studying the "normal" behavior of guano birds because the 
Peruvian coast was beset by an "ecological depression" of outstanding longevity. Late in 
1939, an El Niño disrupted Vogt's early studies and caused massive nesting failure among the 
guano birds. This event lasted almost continuously for two more years and caused guano 
production to plunge to its lowest level since the 1917 El Niño. Vogt interpreted this climate 
event differently from his predecessors. Vogt commissioned an examination of "sick" guano 
birds by Peruvian pathologists and concluded they suffered from malnutrition. This 
confirmed Vogt's initial assumption, derived from reading Elton, that food supply was the 
major factor affecting guano bird population levels. Vogt also reassessed the ecological 
impact of CAG's island hygiene policies. He noted that CAG's rock-removal policy had 
eliminated the surface shelter that the four major predators of bird parasites, two spiders 
(Drysdera murphyi and Loxosceles nesophila) and two lizards (Tropidurus peruvianus and 
Phillodactylus sp.), needed in order to regulate their body temperatures on sunny days. (There 
were plenty of ticks and hot, sunny days on the guano islands during this El Niño, much to 
Vogt's discomfort.) Vogt proposed installing hundreds of small concrete shelters to encourage 
"natural" pest control on the islands. Island cleaning had also removed material the birds 
needed to build nests, Vogt noted, and likely caused increased competition and fighting 
between the birds for scarce nest material. In other words, cleansing the islands to produce 
the purest guano possible may have made them too clean for the guano birds' health.56 
45  
      Although Vogt found it easy to criticize existing practices, he was impressed by some of 
what he saw in Peru. Soon after this sojourn, he traveled to Chile and Mexico to help their 
governments establish local guano industries modeled after CAG. He also intervened to 
prevent a risky plan to transplant hundreds of guanay chicks from Peru to Baja California in 
order to replace the sargento guanero or Brandt's cormorant (Phalacrocorax penicillatus) 
with a more productive guano bird. To cement his legacy in Peru, Vogt arranged for his 
young assistant Enrique Ávila, a native of the Lake Titicaca region, to study wildlife 
management with Leopold in the United States. Ávila returned to CAG in 1946 as Peru's first 
professional, native-born ornithologist. He spent the rest of his career trying to instill Leopold 
and Vogt's environmental doctrines in his countrymen.57 
46  
      Vogt was profoundly affected by his encounter with El Niño on the guano islands. Years 
later, he credited this event for converting him into an outspoken advocate of human 
population control: "Here was mass death in unforgettable shape and sound. Somehow, ever 
since, it has been possible to understand more fully the famines of China and India." Vogt 
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praised CAG—and technocratic governance—in his 1948 manifesto Road to Survival, the 
best-selling book on conservation issues in the United States before Rachel Carson's Silent 
Spring: "Were natural resources generally managed as intelligently as the Peruvians have—in 
this century—managed their guano, the future of the human race could be regarded with 
considerably more optimism." His experience with guano even led Vogt to exhort his 
homeland to "closethe circle" and stop flushing away "Anglo-Saxon" feces, one of the 
world's last untapped sources of natural fertilizer.58 
      In the meantime, CAG implemented a few of Vogt's suggestions. It used explosives to 
remove obstacles that blocked prevailing winds on the islands. CAG workers used the loose 
stone produced by these landscape alterations to build vast networks of containment walls 
designed to prevent hot, thirsty chicks from falling to their deaths in search of water and to 
discourage adult birds from launching themselves into the air from the edge of cliffs where 
their guano would be lost to the sea. (Vogt had observed that birds tend to defecate at take 
off.) 
48  
      The most important policy change adopted by CAG after 1945, however, was originated 
by a new general manager, agronomic engineer Carlos Llosa Belaúnde. He used two of 
Vogt's main findings—food and competition for nesting spacewere the basic factors limiting 
the total size of the breeding population, and most birds migrated south during El Niño years 
when warm surface water flowed in from the north—to deduce that the guano birds lacked 
good nesting sites along several stretches of the Peruvian coast. He came up with a brilliant 
solution: CAG would create artificial "islands" along the southern and north-central coasts by 
building walls to isolate coastal points of land already frequented by roosting guano birds. 
Hunters then would eradicate avian and terrestrial predators from these havens. Llosa hoped 
the new islands would provide a breeding refuge during El Niño years and perhaps prevent 
the guanayes from "wasting" so much of their excrement over Chile. From 1946 to 1961, 
CAG built isolation walls around fourteen mainland points. (In a remarkable case of 
synchronicity, the South African government implemented a similar strategy along the 
Namibian coast during these years to expand the nesting area available to South Atlantic 
marine birds in order to increase the supply of guano to South African export wheat 
agriculture.)59 Llosa's new "islands" worked much better than he expected. They allowed 
Peru's guano birds to surpass their former breeding limits during the 1950s, with the 
additional help of a long stretch of cool years with exceptionally intense upwelling (what 
scientists now call "La Niña" events). This case reveals the extent of local innovation that can 
follow the visit of foreign experts.60 
49  
      In 1956, CAG produced an all-time record 332,223 metric tons of fresh guano containing 
6,200 tons of potassium, 31,600 tons of phosphate, and 47,000 tons of nitrogen—over eleven 
times the amount of nitrogen supplied to Peruvian farmers in an average year during CAG's 
first decade of operation. This largesse of nature enabled Peruvian farmers to consume 
fertilizer in proportions nearly equaling the average for all "developed countries" of the First 
and Second Worlds, and far surpassing the rest of the Third World. As a result of long-
standing changes in distribution policy, the majority of Peruvian guano went to produce food 
crops for local consumption — about a fifth went to smallholders, and a significant fraction 
(6.5 percent) went to farms in the Sierra. In 1956, CAG also made a net profit equivalent to 
$17.2 million in 2005 U.S. dollars (down from $25.4 million in 1955), even though CAG sold 
guano at regulated prices far below what the international market would bear. This income 
supported an elaborate scientific apparatus devoted not only to agronomy, but also to 
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oceanographic research. CAG officials also played an important role on the Comité Nacional 
de Protección a la Naturaleza, an organization of Peruvian scientists and agribusinessmen 
established in 1940 to advocate the establishment of wildlife protection laws, nature reserves, 
and national parks. Peru's guano birds became a source of international prestige and national 
pride, a true spectacle of nature.61 
      But there were storm clouds on the horizon. A consensus existed among CAG scientists 
that the guano island "biome ha[d] arrived at its state of climax." They realized that the guano 
birds were pushing their resource base to the limit and that an "ecological depression" could 
happen at any time. But these worries paled before an emergent threat: the rapid development 
of an industrial fishery based on anchoveta (Engraulis ringens), the guano birds' main food 
source. Beginning after World War II, these small fish were caught in the billions; after the 
collapse of the California sardine industry, they were processed by the trillions to produce 
high-protein feed for the Northern Hemisphere's industrial animals.62 CAG's administrators 
realized the ecological threat this posed to the guano birds and incessantly lobbied Peru's 
government to place strict limits on the growth of the fishmeal industry. When CAG's stable 
of marine scientists failed to persuade the government, CAG invited marine bird expert 
Robert Cushman Murphy and sardine specialist Frances Clark—two of the United States' 
foremost conservation scientists—to study Peruvian marine production with "disinterest" and 
"affection for pure science." They warned that unregulated growth might "kill the hen that 
lays the golden egg" or repeat the "calamitous" history of the California sardine. In response, 
the Peruvian government adopted several experimental fishery regulations designed to protect 
the guano birds, despite vocal opposition from fishing industry experts. This was a small but 
meaningful achievement for the guano industry.63 
51  
      Then came the "ecological depression" CAG had long dreaded. El Niño returned in 1957 
and stayed around until the end of 1958. After a decade of fat years, the inflated guanay and 
piquero populations withered. CAG had no way of feeding this enormous wild population. In 
desperation, CAG directed its workers to intensify their "prophylaxis" of the islands, 
eliminating bird cadavers and destroying the areas favored by bird ectoparasites in the futile 
hope that disease prevention might stem this holocaust. Inspired by Peruvian cotton farmers, 
who were among the first in the world to use DDT and other organo-insecticides on a large 
scale, CAG scientists even tried using Aldrin, benzene hexachloride (BHC), and other 
chemicals to get rid of parasites. Fortunately, these wrong-headed experiments failed: These 
chemicals are now known to cause egg-thinning, breeding failure, and direct poisoning in the 
very birds CAG was trying to protect.64 
52  
      The El Niño of 1957–1958 contributed to an economic crisis affecting the entire country. 
President Manuel Prado initially issued much more rigorous fishery regulations to protect the 
guano birds while "biological studies ... determine the maximum yield possible that will 
protect the national economy." But then a new species of expert stepped into the breach to 
forestall the impending fiscal collapse of the Peruvian state. With crucial support from the 
International Monetary Fund, an avant-garde neoliberal economist, Pedro Beltrán, took over 
national economic planning in 1959 and decided to let the free market determine the fate of 
Peru's marine environment. He abolished all limitations on industrial development and 
installed policies encouraging exports. This provided an enormous boost to the Peruvian 
fishmeal industry whose spectacular growth, in turn, powered a rapid economic recovery. By 
1962, Peru surpassed Japan as the largest fish-producing country by tonnage in the world. 
Meanwhile, a few daring chemical manufacturers tried to take advantage of the guano birds' 
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misfortune and opened Peru's first synthetic fertilizer plants. Yet it proved far more difficult 
and expensive than expected to replace the guano birds with modern chemical technology 
without the sort of protectionist policies Beltrán despised, especially after the guano. The 
guano birds proved the pessimists wrong and temporarily recovered from the disaster of 
1957–1958, eroding the market for the nascent Peruvian chemical industry. In Beltrán's Brave 
New World, Peru's guano birds outcompeted the country's chemical engineers but faced an 
increasingly difficult task competing with Peru's industrial fishermen.65 
      Peru's military could not tolerate this unplanned economic chaos with so many landless 
peasants pouring into Peru's cities and invading vacant lots, and with left-wing guerrilla 
movements springing up in the countryside in the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
Reform-minded military officers took control of the Peruvian state for several months in 
1962–1963. In one of the ironic twists of ecological history, military technocrats used 
William Vogt's most influential contribution to modern environmental thought—the belief 
that human population growth was outstripping its food supply and threatening apocalypse—
to legitimate the replacement of Peru's guano birds. In their view, only a synthetic fertilizer 
industry not subject to recurrent ecological depressions could supply the growing fertilizer 
demand of Peru's exploding human population. Military planners immediately began hiring 
foreign experts to construct Peruvian fertilizer plants based on the Haber-Bosch process. 
CAG was renamed the Corporación Nacional de Fertilizantes (CONAFER) in 1963 to reflect 
this new vision. Using similar reasoning, defenders of Peru's gargantuan fishing industry 
claimed they were helping to feed the world's hungry by exploiting a lower trophic level of 
Peru's marine food chain. According to the gospel of efficiency, fishermen made far better 
use of natural resources than Peru's "anachronistic" guano birds. To back up these lofty 
claims, Peru's fishmeal industrialists began funneling large sums to support Peru's new 
Institute of the Sea (IMARPE) which was established in 1964 and soon became one of the 
world's centers of marine research. The industrialists cynically deemphasized the fact, 
however, that 99 percent of Peru's yearly catch went to produce meat for affluent 
northerners.66 
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      With competition for fish increasing by the day, Peru's guano birds died quite visibly 
during the next El Niño. In the summer of 1965, tens of thousands of starving sea birds 
descended on the open markets of Peru's coastal cities looking for food. This inspired 
enormous public outcry both in Peru and abroad, especially among those disgusted by the 
environmental horrors of Peru's coastal cities, which had become choked with industrial 
fumes and effluent smelling like dead fish. Many Peruvians had come to view the guano birds 
as symbols of national independence. This popular environmental consciousness was an 
important legacy of the guano industry's revival.67 
55  
      By 1965, a civilian government had returned to power. President Fernando Belaúnde, a 
former architecture professor with conflicting populist and technocratic tendencies, 
responded to public clamor by strengthening enforcement of laws to protect the guano 
industry. But this was a short-term response: He granted power to a government commission 
of experts to develop a long-term solution. Many Peruvians still thought of the guano birds as 
"the most valuable birds in the world." The agronomists who led CONAFER and the Ministry 
of Agriculture eloquently defended this point of view. But all those who really counted 
thought otherwise. Why should Peru rein in its most lucrative new industry in order to save 
the guano birds, particularly when Peru's expensive new fertilizer plants were having trouble 
selling their wares?68 
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      But developmentalist arguments did not win the day for the fishing industry. 
Conservationist arguments did. As a paid consultant to the fishing industry, U.S. biologist 
Milner B. Schaefer, the world's leading expert on fish population dynamics, developed a 
method to include guano bird predation in his anchoveta population model. Using computers, 
he quantified exactly how much Peru stood to benefit from the demise of the guano birds. 
Furthermore, Schaefer authoritatively blamed the guano birds' "catastrophic mortality" in 
1965 on El Niño conditions, not to competition from fishing. His "objective cost-benefit 
analysis" converted Coker's "wealth-producing birds" into predatory pests. With Schaefer's 
guidance, fishing industry executives and Peruvian marine scientists developed a plan to give 
scientists regulatory control over the fishmeal industry to ensure a "maximum sustainable 
yield" for human benefit. This sealed the guano birds' fate. In 1966, the Peruvian government 
stopped enforcing regulations protecting the guano birds from the fishing industry, and the 
fishing industry submitted for the first time to a series of limitations recommended by 
IMARPE to protect anchoveta stocks. Against their better instincts, the guano birds abided by 
their part of the deal and have held their population at no more than a few million ever since. 
The gospel of efficiency ended up condemning the Peruvian guano industry to its second 
Dark Age.69 
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      At least for Peru, this was no "age of ecological innocence."70 In the case of the guano 
birds, ecological thinking inspired a crime against nature intended to forestall an apocalypse 
caused by human overpopulation. Similar thinking legitimated the embrace of input-intensive 
agriculture elsewhere in the world, including the massive use of synthetic pesticides attacked 
by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring. It also legitimated the emergence of "bureaucratic-
authoritarian" military regimes elsewhere in Latin America far more brutal than Peru's 
reformist military. How then, with this tragic denouement, can the revival of Peru's guano 
industry be called a success? 
58  
      The second rise and fall of Peru's guano industry is a story of managerial 
accomplishment, though perhaps it is a story distasteful to most environmentalists. 
International conservation scientists emerged from this controversy with regulatory authority 
over the largest fishing industry in the world. The guano industry paled in comparison as a 
producer of wealth—and of excrement. (The vast "animal factories" fishmeal helped make 
possible have come to possess a dangerous propensity to produce vast concentrations of 
animal waste.)71 In view of the guano industry's ability to serve so many interests and survive 
so many crises across five decades, it became all the more plausible for military technocrats 
to envision themselves as the only men capable of directing Peru's chaotic development. 
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      But authoritarian technocrats overreached in Peru. In 1968, the Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces seized control of the Peruvian state—then Peru's 
agribusiness, mines, and fishing industry—and stayed in charge for twelve years. In 
managing these industries, military technocrats lost sight of some significant details, such as 
the El Niño phenomenon. Unfortunately, in the case of Peru's anchoveta fishery, it proved far 
more difficult to manage an industry that depended on killing most of its own breeding stock 
each year than it did to provide birds with enough peace and quiet to cover entire islands with 
the world's most valuable poop.72 Is it any wonder that so many of the world's environmental 
movements—from the United States' dam-busters, to Japan's Minamata survivors, to 
Germany's Burger Initiativen, to India's Chipko protestors—rejected state managerialism? Is 
it any wonder that the scientists who founded Peru's Committee for the Protection of Nature 
became so depressed during the 1970s? Perhaps this case provides us all the more reason to 
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be concerned that "ecocrats" now present themselves as the only ones qualified to accomplish 
"sustainable development" or mitigate global climate change.73 
      Nevertheless, spring is not yet silent on Peru's guano islands. A few million guano birds 
remain. More importantly, a few people still remember the glory days of Peru's second Guano 
Age. Despite the enormous competition from Peru's fishing industry, a small expert-managed 
government company, PROABONOS, continues to shepherd Peru's remaining guano birds—
to serve high-value organic farming and ecotourists.74 Perhaps with a few more 
environmental success stories to serve as examples, this could mark the beginning of Peru's 
third Guano Age. 
61  
 
Gregory T. Cushman is assistant professor of international environmental history at the 
University of Kansas. He is currently revising his manuscript The Lords of Guano: Global 
Science and Peru's Marine Environment and has embarked on a new project focused on climate 




My heartfelt thanks go to those who helped me convert "guano into gold": the Atlantic Worlds 
seminar at the University of Texas at Austin (especially Richard Graham and Matt Childs), the 
Nature and Culture and Andean and Amazonian Worlds seminars at the University of Kansas 
(especially Donald Worster, Ken Armitage, Luis Corteguera, and Bart Dean), Bruce Hunt, Jim 
Fleming, Mauricio Tenorio, Mirna Cabrera, Basilia Díaz de Ávila, Adam Rome, Eve Munson, 
and two anonymous reviewers. The American Meteorological Society, Biblioteca Nacional del 
Perú, PROABONOS, and Instituto del Mar del Perú provided indispensable financial and 
institutional support for this project. 
1. Deut. 23:12–14 (New International Version); Kathleen Meyer, How to Shit in the Woods: An Environmentally 
Sound Approach to a Lost Art (Berkeley, Calif.: Ten Speed Press, 1989); Taro Gomi, Everyone Poops, trans. 
Amanda Mayer Stinchecum (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Kane/Miller Book Publishers, 1993). 
2. The French phrase for "shit in history" is particularly appropriate since French historians have produced several 
celebrated works on the place of excrement in human history: Dominique Laporte, Historia de la mierda, trans. 
Nuria Pérez de Lara (1978; reprint, Valencia, Spain: Pre-Textos, 1998); Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: 
Odor and the French Social Imagination (1982; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). For 
interpretations of the historical impact of Peru's "Guano Age," north and south, see Richard A. Wines, Fertilizer in 
America: From Waste Recycling to Resource Exploitation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985); Paul 
Gootenberg, Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru's "Fictitious Prosperity" of Guano, 1840–1880 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 1. 
3. Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca, Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru: Part One, trans. 
Harold V. Livermore (1609; reprint, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), 246–47; Martin Heinrich Klaproth, 
"Chemische Untersuchung des Guano aus den Inseln der Peruanischen Küste," in Beiträge zur chemischen 
Kenntniss der Mineralkörper, 6 vols. (Berlin: Heinrich August Rottmann, 1807), 4: 299–313; Shane J. Hunt, "Price 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
and Quantum Estimates of Peruvian Exports, 1830–1862" (Discussion paper no. 33, Research Program in Economic 
Development, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1973): 42–49, 
table 21; Robert G. Greenhill and Rory M. Miller, "The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade, 1873–1879," 
Journal of Latin American Studies 5 (1973): 110–11, tables 1–2. 
4. Wines, Fertilizer in America; Jimmy M. Skaggs, The Great Guano Rush: Entrepreneurs and American Overseas 
Expansion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Carmen McEvoy, La utopía republicana: Ideales y realidades en 
la formación de la cultura política peruana (1871–1919) (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1997), 
esp. chs. 3–5. 
5. Recent studies have shown that many features of the U.S. conservation movement were not peculiar to the United 
States: most notably, the essential influence of science professionals, many of whom were empowered to serve the 
interests of resource exploiters. See Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890–1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Michael L. Lewis, Inventing 
Global Ecology: Tracking the Biodiversity Ideal in India, 1947–1997 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004); Stuart 
McCook, States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760–1940 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2002); Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 
1895–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Richard Drayton, Nature's Government: Science, British 
Imperialism, and the "Improvement of the World" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Thomas R. Dunlap, 
Nature and the English Diaspora: Environment and History in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chs. 5–6, 8; John M. MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature: 
Hunting, Conservation, and British Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); and Douglas R. 
Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988). 
6. Nancy Stepan, Beginnings of Brazilian Science: Oswaldo Cruz, Medical Research and Policy, 1890–1920 (New 
York: Science History Publications, 1981), 8–9; and Julyan G. Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine: The Idea of the 
Tropics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000). 
7. "Anexos: Guano explotado ... durante los años 1909–1962," Memoria del Directorio de la Compañía 
Administradora del Guano (Lima) [hereafter, MCAG] 54 (1963); Humberto Tovar, "Las poblaciones de aves 
guaneras en los ciclos reproductivos de 1969/70 a 1973/ 74," Informe del Instituto del Mar del Perúú [hereafter, 
Inf.Inst.Mar Perú] 45 (1978): 12; Felipe Portocarrero, Arlette Beltrán, and María Elena Romero , Compendio 
estadístico del Perú, 1900–1990 (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, Centro de Investigación, 1992), 88 89. 
8. This case contrasts starkly with Arthur F. McEvoy's portrayal of the demise of California's sardine fishery as based 
on the failure of scientists to recognize the volatility and complexity of the Pacific environment. See Arthur F. 
McEvoy, The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850–1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). "All things dull and ugly, / All creatures short and squat, / All things rude and 
nasty, / The Lord God made the lot." Eric Idle, Monty Python Sings, Virgin Records CDVirg 86253. 
9. Robert Cushman Murphy, "Inter-American Conservation," Bird-Lore (May-June 1940): 226. Two North 
American historians, Charley Stansifer and Eric Mills, have recounted to me their vivid recollections of this sublime 
sight. Murphy has no known relation to the author. 
10. On William Vogt's far-reaching influence, see Björn-Ola Linnér, The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and 
Post-war Population Resource Crises (Strond, England: White Horse Press, 2003). I develop this story in much 
greater detail in a separate article tentatively titled "The Road to Survival: William Vogt, Population Ecology, and 
the Peruvian Roots of Modern Environmentalism." 
11. On the "ubiquitous rise" of experts to power in Latin America and beyond, see Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio 
Silva, eds., The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Miguel A. Centeno, 
"The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy," Theory and Society 22 (1993): 307–35; and John 
Markoff and Verónica Montecinos, "The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists," Journal of Public Policy 13 (1993): 37–
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
68. On the influence of scientists over recent environmental politics, see Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards, eds., 
Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); 
Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy Makers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
12. Rory Miller, "The Grace Contract, The Peruvian Corporation, and Peruvian History," Ibero-Amerikanisches 
Archiv, n.s., 9 (1983): 319–48; Rory Miller, "The Making of the Grace Contract: British Bondholders and the 
Peruvian Government, 1885–1890," Journal of Latin American Studies 8 (1976): 73–100; Rory Miller, "British 
Firms and the Peruvian Government, 1885–1930," in Business Imperialism, 1840–1930: An Inquiry Based on 
British Experience in Latin America, ed. D. C. H. Platt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 371–94. 
13. Rory Miller, "The Coastal Elite and Peruvian Politics, 1895–1919," Journal of Latin American Studies 14 (1982): 
97–120; and Peter F. Klarén, "The Origins of Modern Peru, 1880–1930," in The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, ed. Leslie Bethell, 11 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 5: 587–640. 
14. José I. Otero, "Generalidades sobre la costa del Perú," Boletín del Ministerio de Fomento [hereafter, BMFom] 
(Lima) 4 (August 1906): 35–41; Memoria del Ministerio de Fomento [hereafter, MMFom] 12 (1908): 12–13, 18; 
Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru, 1890–1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London: 
Macmillan, 1978), pt. 2; Rory Miller, "Railways and Economic Development in Central Peru, 1890–1930," in Social 
and Economic Change in Modern Peru, ed. Rory Miller, Clifford T. Smith, and John Fisher (Liverpool: Center for 
Latin American Studies, 1975), 27–52; Marcos Cueto and Jorge Lossio, Inovación en la agricultura: Fermín 
Tangüis y el algodón en el Perú (Lima: Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico, 1999). Compare to 
Richard P. Tucker, Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000). 
15. MMFom 1 (1896): 3, 7–8, 70; Marcos Cueto, Excelencia científica en la periferia: Actividades científicas e 
investigación biomédica en el Perú, 1890–1950 (Lima: CONCYTEC, 1989), ch. 2; Jesús Chavarría, "The 
Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modern Peruvian Nationalism, 1870–1919," Hispanic American Historical Review 50 
(1970): 25778; Charles Hale, "Political and Social Ideas in Latin America, 1870–1930," in Cambridge History of 
Latin America, ed. Bethell, 4:367–41; see also n. 5. 
16. See Figure 1 for a partial chronology of significant El Niño events. Robert Cushman Murphy, Bird Islands of 
Peru: The Record of a Sojourn on the West Coast (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), 62; Robert Cushman 
Murphy, "The Oceanography of the Peruvian Littoral with Reference to the Abundance and Distribution of Marine 
Life," Geographical Review 13 (1923): 64–85; George Evelyn Hutchinson, "Survey of Existing Knowledge of 
Biogeochemistry: 3. The Biogeochemistry of Vertebrate Excretion," Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural 
History 96 (1950): 71–78; and Michael H. Glantz, Currents of Change: Impacts of El Niño and La Niña on Climate 
and Society, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. ch. 3. 
17. See the October-November 1853 reports to the Peruvian government reprinted in Boletín de la Compañía 
Adminstradora del Guano (Lima) [hereafter, BCAG] 4 (March 1928): 155 94. For a noteworthy precedent, see Rose 
Marie Buechler, "Technical Aid to Upper Peru: The Nordenflicht Expedition," Journal of Latin American Studies 5 
(1973): 37–77. 
18. Using cladistic and DNA evidence, recent taxonomists have tended to classify the guanay as a shag (Leucocarbo), 
though they are undecided whether shags qualify as a subfamily, genera, or subgenera separate from "true" 
cormorants. In contrast, recent taxonomists have tended to lump together all brown pelicans of the Americas as 
subspecies of P. occidentalis. Robert Cushman Murphy, Oceanic Birds of South America, 2 vols. (New York: 
MacMillan, 1936), 1: 94–108, 2: 819–46, 899–909; Paul A. Johnsgard, Cormorants, Darters, and Pelicans of the 
World (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 10–13, 15–16, 249–52, 387–97. 
19. MMFom 10 (1906): xxiv; BMFom 4 (July 1906): 7, 93; Robert E. Coker, "Aves guaneras y extracción de guano," 
MMFom vol. 12, anexos 161, 162 (1908): 5–30; Robert E. Coker, "Regarding the Future of the Guano Industry and 
the Guano-Producing Birds of Peru," Science (10 July 1908): 59; H. Eugene Lehman, "Robert Ervin Coker, 1876–
1967," The Journal of the Elisha Mitchell Scientific Society 84 (Summer 1968): 333–34; George Lee Simpson, Jr., 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
The Cokers of Carolina: A Social Biography of a Family (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956), 
247–49. 
20. Coker, "Aves guaneras"; Coker, "Regarding the Future," 58–64. 
21. "La Extracción y venta del guano: Información de una compañía," La Prensa (Lima), 3 March 1909 (morning 
ed.), 1; Estatutos de la Compañía Administradora del Guano [hereafter, ECAG] (Lima, 1923), 5, 15–16, 29–31; 
MCAG 5 (1914): 23; Pablo Macera, "El guano y la agricultura peruana de exportación, 1909–1945," in Trabajos de 
historia, 4 vols. (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1977), 4:324–30. 
22. MCAG 3 (1912): 3, 47, 49; MCAG 5 (1914): 29. 
23. MCAG 5 (1914): 29–41, 45–58, 51–53. 
24. Ibid., 44; MCAG 3 (1912): 5, 44; Walter von Ohlendorff, Die Guano-Fundorte in Peru: Photographische 
Originalaufnahmen der Anglo-Continentalen Guano-Werke, Hamburg, Emmerich, Antwerpen, London (Hamburg: 
1903); "Forbes, Dr. Henry Ogg," Who Was Who, 1929–1940: A Companion to Who's Who Containing the 
Biographies of Those Who Died during the Period 1929–1940 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1941); H. O. 
Forbes, A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago: A Narrative of Travel and Exploration from 1878 to 
1883 (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1885), 51 117. See also Mike Davis, Late Victorian 
Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (London: Verso, 2001), pt. 1. 
25. MCAG 5 (1914): 67, 70–72, 86–91; MCAG 12 (1921): 34. 
26. MCAG 5 (1914): 93–101. 
27. MCAG 7 (1916): iv, 86–87; CAG, Sección Técnica, Las necesidades de guano de la agricultura nacional: 
Informe presentado por el jefe de la sección Ingeniero Agrónomo Sr. José Antonio de Lavalle y García (Lima: 
Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1916), 13–16; Macera, "El guano," 388, 396–401. 
28. Murphy, Bird Islands, 66, 69; Vaclav Smil, Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the 
Transformation of World Food Production (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), esp. chs. 4–5; Miller, "British Firms and 
the Peruvian Government," 382, 386; Macera, "El guano," 334. 
29. See Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo, Apogeo y crisis de la República Aristocrática: Oligarquía, 
aprismo y comunismo en el Perú, 1895–1932, 3rd ed. (Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Perú, 1984); Manuel Perlo Cohen, 
El paradigma porfiriano: Historia del desagüe del Valle de México (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrua, 1999); 
Lane Simonian, Defending the Land of the Jaguar: A History of Conservation in Mexico (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1995), chs. 3–5; Teresa A. Meade, "Civilizing" Rio: Reform and Resistance in a Brazilian City, 1889–
1930 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), ch. 3; and José Drummond, "The Garden in the 
Machine: An Environmental History of Brazil's Tijuca Forest," Environmental History 1 (January 1996): 83–104. 
30. Stephen R. Gliessman, Agroecology: Ecological Processes in Sustainable Agriculture (Chelsea, Mich.: Sleeping 
Bear Press, 1998); and Donald Worster, "Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in 
History," Journal of American History 76 (1990): 1087–1106. 
31. In industrial France and the colonial Philippines, in contrast, experts used similar means to rid the human 
environment of dangerous excrement and maximize industrial production and consumption. See Jean-Pierre 
Goubert, The Conquest of Water: The Advent of Health in the Industrial Age, trans. Andrew Wilson (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); and Warwick Anderson, "Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the 
Poetics of Pollution," Critical Inquiry 21 (Spring 1995): 640–69. On the global spread of scientific management, see 
Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003); William M. Tsutsui, Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists 
and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920–1964 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996); and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhovanism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On its ties to ecology, see Gregg Mitman, The State of Nature: 
Ecology, Community, and American Social Thought, 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
32. Murphy, Bird Islands, 66, 69, 278; MCAG 6 (1915): vii; MCAG 33 (1942): xliii; MCAG 12 (1921): 84; MCAG 13 
(1922): 37; MCAG 17 (1926): 11; MCAG 22 (1931): 208; MCAG 27 (1936): 180; MCAG 33 (1942): xliii, xlv; and 
Humberto Tovar, Victor Guillén, and María E. Nakama, "Monthly Population Size of Three Guano Bird Species off 
Peru, 1953 to 1982," in The Peruvian Anchoveta and Its Upwelling Ecosystem: Three Decades of Change, ed. D. 
Pauly, et al. (Callao: Instituto del Mar del Perú, 1987), 208–18. 
33. These conclusions are based on an island schedule I constructed for this entire period using yearly reports in 
MCAG. Compare to Luis Gamarra Dulanto, "Informe sobre las investigaciones de pérdida de nitrógeno en los 
guanos," BCAG 18 (September 1942): 283 98. For critiques of CAG's rotation policy, see Robert E. Coker, "Peru's 
Wealth-Producing Birds," National Geographic Magazine (June 1920): 559; MCAG 8 (1917): 31–37; MCAG 18 
(1927): 222–30; MCAG 12 (1921): 11; MCAG 14 (1923): xii; and MCAG 15 (1924): xiii. 
34. Each MCAG during this period lists all operating guard stations. See also MCAG 17 (1926): 120–21; MCAG 19 
(1928): 271–74; Antonio Raimondi, "Apuntes sobre el huano y las aves que lo producen," BCAG 2 (Sept. 1926): 
450, [originally published 1856]; Coker, "Peru's Wealth-Producing Birds," 557–58; Murphy, Bird Islands, 266–68, 
276–77; Murphy, Oceanic Birds, 1: 292–93, 453–54, 2: 774–75, 778, 877; David Cameron Duffy, Coppelia Hays, 
and Manuel A. Plenge, "The Conservation Status of Peruvian Seabirds," in Status and Conservation of the World's 
Seabirds, ed. J. P. Croxall, P. G. H. Evans, and R. W. Shreiber (Cambridge: International Council for Bird 
Preservation, 1984), 246, 253; and C. Hilton-Taylor, ed., 2000 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Gland, 
Switzerland and Cambridge, UK, 2000), http://www.redlist.org/search/details.php?species=16485 [also 
species=16832, 20609]. 
35. Murphy, Bird Islands, 88–89, 122–23, 204–6, 282–83, 287–89; Murphy, Oceanic Birds of South America, 
2:1013–16, 1052–71; MCAG 6 (1915): vii; MCAG 8 (1917): ix, 43–46; MCAG 9 (1918): 9; MCAG 13 (1922): 53; 
and ECAG, 16, 50–51. 
36. Informe que sobre la Compañía Administradora del Guano eleva al Supremo Gobierno por conducto del 
Ministerio de Hacienda, la Comisión nombrada por Resolución Suprema de 18 de Junio de 1941 (Lima: Librería e 
Imprenta Gil, 1942), 32, 46, 50, 66; William Vogt journal, Isla Santa Rosa, 5 May 1939, William Vogt papers, 
Denver Public Library, Denver, Colo., box 3:1 [hereafter, Vogt papers]; MCAG 44 (1953): iii-vi; Duffy, Hays, and 
Plenge, "The Conservation Status of Peruvian Seabirds," 251; and Hilton-Taylor, ed., 2000 IUCN Red List of 
Threatened Species [species=40258]. For a discussion of conservationist's changing attitude toward "varmints," see 
Thomas R. Dunlap, Saving America's Wildlife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Donald Worster, 
Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 13. 
37. Murphy, Bird Islands, 79; Raúl Palacios Rodríguez, Historia marítima del Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios 
Históric-Marítimos del Perú, 1991) , bk. 12, vol. 2, p. 346; Robert E. Coker, "La caza de lobos en el Perú," BCAG 9 
(August 1933): 224, 234–37; "La caza de lobos y pesca de ballenas y bufeos en el Perú," BMFom 5 (December 
1907): 64–95; "Encomendadando a la Compañía la caza de lobos del mar," BCAG 12 (August 1936): 340; Erwin 
Schweigger, "Informe sobre la caza de lobos del mar," BCAG 16 (September 1940): 296–97; William Vogt, "Los 
lobos y las aves guaneras," BCAG 15 (October 1939): 397–99; Alberto González Zúñiga, "Lobos marinos: Fuente 
de riqueza," BCAG 20 (May 1944): 12733; and Peter Muck and Humberto Fuentes, "Sea Lion and Fur Seal 
Predation on the Peruvian Anchoveta, 1953–1982," in The Peruvian Anchoveta, ed. Pauly, 234–47. 
38. On biomedical trends in Peru, see Cueto, Excelencia científica en la periferia; Cueto, "Andean Biology in Peru: 
Scientific Styles in the Periphery," Isis 80 (1989): 640–58. See also McCook, States of Nature, esp. 21–22, 78–79, 
82–102; Meade, "Civilizing" Rio; Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine; and Stepan, Beginnings of Brazilian Science. 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
39. José Antonio de Lavalle y García, "Informe preliminar sobre la causa de la mortalidad anormal de las aves 
ocurrida en el mes de marzo del presente año," MCAG 8 (1917): 6188; MCAG 8 (1917): ix, 32; ECAG, 16; MCAG 
12 (1921): 11; MCAG 15 (1924): 108; MCAG 19 (1928): 254–55; Luis Gamarra Dulanto, "Los peligros que implica 
la cría de aves de corral en las islas guaneras," BCAG 10 (January-April 1934): 43–44; Raúl Rebagliati, "Informe 
sobre recientes enfermedades de las aves," BCAG 12 (May 1936): 149–54; and U.S. Deparment of the Interior, U.S. 
Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center, "Fact Sheet: Avian Cholera," (2001) 
http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/whats_new/fact_sheet/fact_cholera.html. 
40. MCAG 9 (1918): 14; MCAG 12 (1921): 14; MCAG 14 (1923): xv-xvi; MCAG 17 (1926): xx; Coker, "Peru's 
Wealth-Producing Birds," 562, 564; and Murphy, Bird Islands, 96. 
41. MCAG 9 (1918): 12; MCAG 14 (1923): xv-xvi; MCAG 15 (1924): xix-xx; MCAG 17 (1926): 54; MCAG 23 
(1932): xvii; MCAG 27 (1936): 241–48; Vogt journal, Isla Santa Rosa, 5 May 1939, photograph, August 1939, roll 
29, Vogt papers, box 3:1, 4:1; Robert Cushman Murphy, "Los invertebrados terrestres de las islas guanera," MCAG 
12 (1921): 95–116; M. Federico Ocampo, "Las condiciones sanitarias de las islas del sur: Informe presentado por el 
Doctor M. Federico Ocampo, médico de las islas del sur, a la Compañía Administradora del Guano al finalizar la 
campaña 1924–1925," BCAG 2 (January 1926): 37–52; and F. García Llaque, "Contribución al estudio de las 
condiciones higiénicas de la industria del guano de las isles," BCAG 18 (November 1942): 343–401. Compare to 
Florencia Mallon, The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist 
Transition, 1860–1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), and n. 46 below. 
42. See reports filed in Archivo de Admón, Zona Norte, preserved by PROABONOS, Callao; Murphy, Bird Islands, 
341–42; Macera, "El guano," 419–20. 
43. Adulteration of guano had been a perennial problem for farmers: see Wines, Fertilizer in America, 126–35. 
MCAG 3 (1912): 4–5, 43; MCAG 9 (1918): 12; MCAG 11(1920): xiii, 1; MCAG 17 (1926): xiv, xx; MCAG 22 
(1931): xiv; MCAG 23 (1932): i, xvi; Coker, "Peru's Wealth-Producing Birds," 564. MCAG 29 (1938): xv-xvii, 
clearly show the amount of integration CAG developed over three decades. Compare to Theodore Porter, Trust in 
Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
44. "Lavalle y García, José Antonio de" Diccionario biográfico de peruanos contemporáneos, ed. Juan Pedro Paz-
Soldán (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1917, 1921); MCAG 3 (1912): 59; MCAG 8 (1917): xii; MCAG 13 (1922): 
14; MCAG 14 (1923): xiv, 11; MCAG 17 (1926): xvi-xvii, 14; MCAG 20 (1929): xiv; MCAG 23 (1932): xiv; and 
CAG, Sección Técnica, Las necesidades de guano. For a directory of the Boletín's international distribution, see 
BCAG 2 (November 1926): 592–606. On the abstraction process involving wheat agriculture, see William Cronon, 
Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), ch. 3. 
45. CAG, Sección Técnica, Las necesidades de guano, 117–205, 209–40, graph following p. 294; "Anexos: Detalle 
de la distribución y venta del guano en los puertos," MCAG 3–26 (1912–1935); "Anexos: Clasificación de las ventas 
de guano a la agricultura nacional y su contenido en unidades de nitrógeno," MCAG 26, 33 (1935, 1942); MCAG 12 
(1921): 15; MCAG 13 (1922): 8–9; and MCAG 14 (1923): 55–57. 
46. Michael J. Gonzales, "Planters and Politics in Peru, 1895–1919," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (1991): 
515–31; Michael J. Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 1875–1933 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1985); Vincent C. Peloso, Peasants on Plantations: Subaltern Strategies of Labor and 
Resistancein the Pisco Valley, Peru (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), esp. 118–19; and JoséCarlos 
Mariátegui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, trans. Marjory Urquidi (1928; reprint, Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1971), ch. 3. 
47. MCAG 18 (1927): ii, x; MCAG 22 (1931): xiv. See Gregory T. Cushman, "Enclave Vision: Foreign Networks in 
Peru and the Internationalization of El Niño Research during the 1920s," History of Meteorology 1 (2004): 65–74, 
available at http://www.meteohistory.org/2004proceedings1.1.). 
48. ECAG, 47, 49–50, 55, 61–64; MCAG 12 (1921): 54–57; MCAG 13 (1922): 72; MCAG 14 (1923): 19–23; MCAG 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
15 (1924): 79–83; MCAG 16 (1925): xiii, 11–38; MCAG 17 (1926): xv-xvi; and MCAG 20 (1929): xi-xiii, 258–63. 
49. See, for example, Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of 
American Conservation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); Stephan Amend and 
Thora Amend, eds., National Parks without People? The South American Experience, trans. Lilian de Croce and 
Christopher Canaday (Quito, Ecuador: IUCN/Parques Nacionales y Construcción Ambiental, 1995); Jonathan S. 
Adams and Thomas O. McShane, The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation without Illusion (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1992). 
50. MCAG 22 (1931), xv-xvi; MCAG 23 (1932): 217–20; MCAG 25 (1934): xi; and MCAG 26 (1935): xiii, 269–70. 
On the "desertion of the elites" and rise of mass politics during these years, see Steve Stein, Populism in Peru: The 
Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). 
51. MCAG 23 (1932): v; MCAG 27 (1936): ix, xiv; and Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890–1977, 175, 177, 198–99. 
52. Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890–1977, 170–72; MCAG 26 (1935): v, 237, 244–45, 339; MCAG 27 (1936): vii, ix, 
183; MCAG 29 (1938): vii, ix, 240; MCAG 30 (1939): iv, vi-vii, 50–55; MCAG 33 (1942): iv; and "Importante: 
Instrucciónes para la buena conservación y aprovechamiento del guano," BCAG 11 (November 1935): 511. 
53. "Some Notes on WV for Mr. Best to Use as He Chooses in Connection with a Possible Article," n.d., Vogt 
papers, box 5:1; Mark V. Barrow, A Passion for Birds: American Ornithology after Audubon (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), esp. 171, 179, 190–94, 259 n. 145; Frank Graham, Jr., The Audubon Ark: A History of the 
National Audubon Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 117–18, 133–34, 142–44; Robert Cushman Murphy 
and William Vogt, "The Dovekie Influx of 1932," The Auk 50 (July 1933): 325–49; William Vogt, "Preliminary 
Notes on the Behavior and the Ecology of the Eastern Willet," Proceedings of the Linnaean Society of New York 49 
(October 1938): 8–42. Compare to Robert M. Wilson, "Directing the Flow: Migratory Waterfowl, Scale, and 
Mobility in Western North America," Environmental History 7 (April 2002): 247–66. 
54. Several recent histories have traced the far-reaching international influence of Elton's "Oxford School of Imperial 
Ecology" on ecological theory and the practice of animal management; some are beginning to address Leopold's 
practical impact: Anker, Imperial Ecology; Dennis Chitty, Do Lemmings Commit Suicide? Beautiful Hypotheses and 
Ugly Facts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Peter Crowcroft, Elton's Ecologists: A History of the 
Bureau of Animal Population (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); Dunlap, Saving America's Wildlife. 
55. MCAG 30 (1939): x, 64–65; William Vogt, "Enumeración preliminar de algunos problemas relacionados con la 
producción del guano en el Perú," BCAG 15 (July 1939): 287–89; William Vogt, "Informe anual del ornitólogo," 
BCAG 16 (May 1940): 145–68; José Antonio de Lavalle y García, "Estudio sobre los factores que influyen sobre la 
distribución de los nidos de aves productoras de guano," MCAG 9 (1918): 207–13. 
56. Vogt, "Enumeración preliminar," 293–94; Vogt, "'Informe anual del ornitólogo," 150–52, 158–59; William Vogt, 
"Una depresión ecológica en la costa peruana," BCAG 16 (October 1940): 307–29; William Vogt, "Aves guaneras," 
BCAG 17 (April 1941): 128, 130, 133, 135, 137–38, 167; William Vogt, "Las lagartijas y las aves guaneras," BCAG 
15 (September 1939): 346–48; William Vogt, "Informe sobre las aves guaneras por el ornitólogo americano Señor 
William Vogt," BCAG 18 (March 1942): 346–48. See Also William Vogt, "Informe sobre las aves ... Vogt," BCAG 
18 (March 1942):3–132. 
57. See the extensive correspondence on William Vogt's visits to Mexico and Chile and between Vogt and Enrique 
Ávila in Vogt papers, box 1:1–4; Vogt, Más guano blanco: Posibles recursos de la costa desértica chilena (Santiago 
de Chile: Sociedad Chilena de Fertilizantes, 1945); interview by the author with Basilia Díaz viuda de Ávila and 
Ingrid Ávila Díaz, Lima, Peru, 13 June 2001; Enrique Ávila, "Ética en marcha," BCAG 30 (May 1954): 22–23—a 
personal interpretation of Leopold's celebrated land ethic that was distributed to hundreds of Peruvian farmers and 
scientists. 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
58. William Vogt, People! Challenge to Survival (New York: Sloane Associates, 1960), 124–25; Vogt, Road to 
Survival (New York: William Sloane, 1948), 110, 155, 186, 221. 
59. I have found no evidence that these projects were linked in any way—except by the original 1840s "guano rush." 
See P. B. Best, R. J. M. Crawford, and R. P. Van Der Elst, "Top Predators in Southern Africa's Marine Ecosystems," 
in A Century of Marine Science in South Africa, ed. A. I. L. Payne and J. R. E. Lutjeharms, Transactions of the 
Royal Society of South Africa 52 (1997): 188–91; Lance Van Sittert, University of Cape Town, personal 
communication. 
60. MCAG 38 (1947): i-ii, v-vi; MCAG 39 (1948): vii; MCAG 40 (1949): v-vi; MCAG 44 (1953): iv; MCAG 45 
(1954): v; MCAG 46 (1955): vi; MCAG 47 (1956): vi, xvii; MCAG 48 (1957): vi; MCAG 49 (1958): xvii-xviii; 
MCAG 52 (1961): xi; Robert Cushman Murphy, El guano y la pesca de anchoveta: Informe oficial al Supremo 
Gobierno (Lima: Compañía Administradora del Guano, July 1954), 23–24; Robert Cushman Murphy, "Peru Profits 
from Sea Fowl," National Geographic Magazine, March 1959, 401, 404–5, 408–9; Martin Rodewald, "Beiträge zur 
Klimaschwankung im Meere: 10. Beitrag: Die Anomalie der Wassertemperatur und der Zirkulation im 
Nordpazifischen Ozean und an der Küste Perus im Jahre 1955," Deutschen Hydrographischen Zeitschrift 11 (1958): 
78–82. 
61. "Anexos: Guano explotado ... durante los años 1909–1962," MCAG 54 (1963); UNESCO, Comisión Económica 
para América Latina [CEPAL], El uso de fertilizantes en América Latina (10 October 1966), Doc. E/CN.12/760, pp. 
6, 8, 14–15, 94; "Anexos: Detalle de la distribución y venta del guano," MCAG 48 (1957); "Anexos: Guano rico—
ventas menores," MCAG 48 (1957); Boletín del Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza (Lima) 1 (1944), 20 
(1970); Murphy, "Peru Profits from Sea Fowl"; and Tovar, Guillén, and Nakama, "Monthly Population ," 213–14. 
For a measure of CAG's marine science apparatus, see Boletín científico de la Compañía Administradora del Guano 
(Lima) 1–2 (1953–1955). 
62. On the emergence of Peru's fishmeal industry and its ties to the industrial production of livestock, see Baltazar 
Caravedo Molinari, Estado, pesca, y burguesía: Teoría y realidad (Lima: Centro de Proyección Cristiana, 1979); 
David Carson Edmonds, "Reasons Underlying Development of the Peruvian Fishing Industry in the Post World War 
II Period," (PhD diss., American University, 1971); and William Boyd, "Making Meat: Science, Technology, and 
the Industrialization of American Poultry Production," Technology and Culture 42 (2001): 631–64. 
63. Luis Gamarra Dulanto, "Ensayo sobre la zoonomía de las aves guaneras," Boletín científico de la Compañía 
Administradora del Guano (Lima) 2 (1955): 113, 117; MCAG 45 (1954): viii, 5–6, 7–9, 11; Murphy, El guano y la 
pesca de anchoveta, esp. 9–10, 38; Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería, La anchoveta y la harina de pescado (Lima, 
1954); and MCAG 48 (1957): 25–26. 
64. Tovar, Guillén, and Nakama, "Monthly Population"; Johannes Wille, "Biological Control of Certain Cotton 
Insects and the Application of New Organic Insecticides in Peru," Journal of Economic Entomology 44 (1951): 13–
18; MCAG 50 (1959), x, anexos; Rómulo Jordán to Luis Massa Giuffré, "Informe sobre experimentos con 
garrapaticidas," 15 April 1960, Archivo de la Compañía Administradora del Guano, Estación de Biología Marina, 
Isla Don Martín, Peru. 
65. MCAG 50 (1959), 14–17; Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890–1977, 278–79; Geoffrey Bertram, "Peru, 1930–60," in 
Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Bethell, 8: 420–22, 436–47; Arturo Salazar Larraín, introduction to Pedro 
G. Beltrán: Pensamiento y acción (selección de textos) (Lima: Instituto de Economía de Libre Mercado, 1994), 7–
21; and Thyrele Robertson, The Peruvian Fertilizer Industry, Present Situation and Future Prospects, Iowa-Peru 
Program, Economic Study No. 4 (Lima: Iowa Universities Mission to Peru, 1968), 14–17, 21–27, 35, 77–78. 
66. Carlos Contreras and Marcos Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo: Desde las luchas por la Independencia 
hasta el presente, 2nd ed. (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000), 296–99; CEPAL, La oferta de fertilizantes 
en América Latina (3 November 1966), Doc. E/CN.12/761, pp. 102–110; CEPAL, El uso de fertilizantes en América 
Latina, 3–5, 9095; "Créase la Corporación Nacional de Fertilizantes: Decreto Ley No. 14502," Boletín de la 
Corporación Nacional de Fertilizantes [hereafter, BCONAFER] 1 (July 1963): 3–4; Memoria del Directorio de la 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
Corporación Nacional de Fertilizantes 2 (1965): 9–14; "La tragedia de la abundancia," Pesca, October 1960, 5–8; 
"Una realidad: Harina para consumo humano," Pesca, August 1961, 13–17, 19–21; "El tabú de nuestro tiempo," 
Pesca, October 1962, 26–30; "Hambre en el mundo," Pesca, October 1962, 22–23; "Hambre en el Perú," Pesca, 
October 1962, 24; "Nunca hubo 40 millones de aves," Pesca, March 1964, 39–43; "Guerra a la desnutrición," Pesca 
September 1964, 14–20; Enrique del Solar, Manuel Elguera, and Edgardo Llosa, "Informe de la comisión nombrada 
para estudiar el plan tentativo presentado por el Consejo de Investigaciones Hidrobiológicas y presentar 
recomendaciones al Directorio de la SNP" (Lima, 23 April 1964), University of California, Institute of Marine 
Resources, Records, Office of the Director (AC 3), Scripps Institution of Oceanography Library, University of 
California, San Diego, La Jolla, Calif., [hereafter, UC-IMR], group 3, fol. 174; and IMARPE, "El IMARPE y sus 
principales investigaciones científicas hasta 1965," Informe Especial (La Punta, Callao) 5 (March 1966). 
67. Rómulo Jordán and Humberto Fuentes, "Las poblaciones de aves guaneras y su situación actual," Inf.Inst.Mar 
Perú 10 (1966): 9, 29; Prince Philip to Felipe Benavides, 5 April 1966, Biblioteca Municipal, Pueblo Libre, Lima, 
Peru, special exhibition [27 April 2001]; "Coalición contra olores," Pesca, February 1961, 22; "Una decisión 
desatinada," Pesca, March 1961, 8–9; "Olores: Solución a la vista," Pesca, November 1961, 15–17, 20–21, 23–25; 
and "Callao: Primer Puerto pesquero del mundo," Pesca, January-February 1962, 14. 
68. "'El Niño' y las aves," Pesca September 1965, 10–13; "Medidas recomendadas al Supremo Gobierno en relacion 
con las aves guaneras: Informe presentado por la Sub-Comisión 1: Decreto Supremo No. 67 de 12 de noviembre de 
1965," BCONAFER 4 (January-April 1966): 94–108; Peru, Comisión de Estudio sobre las Aves Guaneras, Informe 
singular de la Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería, integrante de la comisión nombrada por Decreto Supremo no. 67 de 
12 de noviembre de 1965 (Lima, July 1966); "Declaraciones de Cubas," Pesca, September 1966, 21–23. 
69. Milner B. Schaefer, "Dynamics of the Fishery for the Anchoveta Engraulis ringens, off Peru," Boletín del 
Instituto del Mar del Perú 1 (June 1967): 189–304, quotes on 291–92; IMARPE, "La pesquería de la anchoveta," 
Inf.Inst.Mar Perú 1 (1965); and IMARPE, "Efectos de la pesca en el stock de anchoveta," Inf.Inst.Mar Perú 7 
(1965). See also the extensive correspondence between Schaefer and Peruvian officials on these issues in UC-IMR, 
group 4; and Tim D. Smith, Scaling Fisheries: The Science of Measuring the Effects of Fishing, 1855–1955 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 249–66. 
70. Compare to Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York: Longman, 2000), 63–68. 
71. Richard P. Horowitz, Hog Ties: Pigs, Manure, and Mortality in American Culture (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1998). 
72. On Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, see Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in 
Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). On the collapse of Peru's fishing industry in 
1972–1973, see C. P. Idyll, "The Anchovy Crisis," Scientific American (June 1973): 22–29. 
73. Guha, Environmentalism, chs. 5–6; Boletín del Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza 20 (1970); 
Wolfgang Sachs, "Environment and Development: The Story of a Dangerous Liaison," The Ecologist 21 (1991): 
252–57; and Miller and Edwards, eds., Changing the Atmosphere. 
74. To find out more about PROABONOS (est. 1997) and view a gallery of historic photographs, see 
http://www.proabonos.gob.pe/. On marine ecotourism, see Marcia Bonta, "A Peruvian Safari," Americas (March-
April 1986);:16–23. 
 
©2005 American Society for Environmental History 
 
Cushman, Gregory T. “‘The Most Valuable Birds in the World’: International Conservation Science and the Revival of Peru’s Guano 
Industry, 1909-1965.” Environmental History 10,no. 3 (July 2005): 477-509. Publisher's Version:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986000/ . 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/ . 
